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In analysing the impact of education on wage differentials and wage growth, we use next to personal 
characteristics (e.g. education and experience) also job characteristics (e.g. skills required) to explain 
wages. We estimate wage equations on individual data for Germany, 1984 – 2000. When discussing 
observed and previously unobserved heterogeneity it turns out that personal characteristics like 
education and experience explain about half of the variation in wages. At least 20 per cent is explained 
by variation in job characteristics. When comparing the results with similar research for the 
Netherlands an the USA, the returns to experience are the same in all countries, while the premiums 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is a growing amount of literature that argues that wages are determined by both personal 
characteristics and job characteristics. A theoretical motivation for this notion is provided by the 
assignment or allocation literature stresses the interaction between demand and supply when 
explaining earnings differentials – cf. Hartog (1992) and Sattinger (1993). However, also imperfect-
information search theoretical arguments and even human capital theory can provide a motivation to 
include job-related variables in the widely used Mincer (1974) earnings function (Hartog, 2000a), or 
the theory of career mobility (Sicherman and Galor, 1990; Büchel and Mertens, 2000). 
Along these lines, Muysken and Ruholl (2001) show that for the Netherlands 1986 – 1998 
indeed wage differentials should be explained by both personal and job characteristics. Roughly 
speaking half of the variation in wages can be explained by changes in personal characteristics, while 
the other half is explained by changes in job characteristics. Similar results were found by Muysken et 
al (2002) for the United States, 1986-1996. In this study we will reproduce their analysis for Germany, 
1984 – 2000, using GSOEP data and compare the results with those found for the Netherlands and the 
USA. 
 
To illustrate the relevance of different developments in these characteristics we look at education as a 
person-related variable and skills required as a job-related variable – these variables turn out to be 
important determinants of wage differentials as we show below. Figure 1 shows the increase in 
educational attainment in Germany for the period 1984 – 2000 from our data. During that decade the 
share of the working persons without further education than secondary school fell from 30,5 to 15,2 
per cent. However, the share with college and full academic education (Fachhochschule or University) 
increased from 9,5 to 20,7 per cent over that period. A similar development can be observed for the 
Netherlands – and to a lesser extent in the USA. 
Figure 2 shows that the share of jobs requiring high skills (high and medium white collar jobs) 
increased from 6,75 to 13,5 per cent over the observation period – this is much less than the increase 
in the corresponding share in educational attainment. Although popular belief might suggest that the 
USA has an abundance of low skilled jobs when compared to Europe, the share around 30 percent in 
the USA is hardly higher than the share around 28% in the Netherlands. However, the corresponding 
share of low skilled jobs in Germany is hard to identify. The share of “no collar”-jobs is much lower: 
it remained stable around 12 percent. The share of “blue collar”-jobs dropped from 47% to 37%. But, 
as Freeman and Schettkat (1999) argue, apparently low-skilled persons in Germany have much higher 
skills when compared to the USA. Therefore the skill classifications in Germany are very hard to 
compare with those in the USA. We elaborate on the classification of skills below. 
   3
Figure 1  Share of the workforce in Germany with respect to education, 1984 – 2000 
 
Figure 2  Share of the workforce in Germany with respect to required skills, 1984 – 2000 
 
Comparison of Figures 1 and 2 suggests that the average level of education did increase stronger over 
time than the average level of skills required. This is consistent with the findings of Asselberghs cs. 
(1998) for the Netherlands and Auerbach and Skott (2000) and Wolff (2000) for the USA. Moreover, 
this phenomenon has been observed in many countries, cf. the survey by Groot and Maassen van den 
Brink (2000).
1  
The incidence of overeducation is also well documented for Germany. Table 1 summarises the 
findings from several studies for German males. One sees that the incidence of overeducation is about 
                       
1 Auerbach and Skott (2000, n. 7) point out rightly that the conclusion of Groot and Maassen van den Brink that 



































school degree only  4
15 per cent, whereas that of undereducation is much lower.
2 We elaborated on the methods used to 
determine job requirements below. 
 
Table 1   Over- and undereducation for German males (shares) 
 
Period Overeducation  Undereducation  Source Method 
1984  14  6.9  Daly et. al. (2000)  Subjective 
1984 – 1998  12  10  Bauer (2002)  Mean 
1984 – 1998  30  20  Bauer (2002)  Mode 






Figure 3, which uses our classification, demonstrates that upskilling and overeducation in the 
Germany took place in all job categories.
3 Acemoglu (2002) explains this finding by skill-biased 
technological change, which accelerated since the early 1970s. Thus the average education of workers 
on jobs with a certain level of skills required has increased over time. This can be observed for each 
level, but the increase is higher the lower the required skill is. The latter phenomenon indicates that 
next to general upskilling, also bumping down has occurred.
4 
 
Figure  3  Average educational level of the workforce in Germany for each level of required 
skills, 1984 – 2000 
 
The above findings suggest that in explaining the development of wages, we should also take into 
account the job characteristics of the workforce, next to personal characteristics. Section 2 shows that 
this notion is already well established in the literature and presents a wage equation which takes this 
                       
2 The shares found for female workers are consistently higher for both over- and undereducation. 
3 The data for high skilled jobs from 1992 onwards are affected by the impact of the reunification. We ignore the 
data for 1994 because definition problems clearly show up here. 
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feature into account. Section 3 describes the data for which this equation will be estimated. The new 
element in our results compared to earlier studies is that we track the development of wages over a 
longer period, 1984 – 2000, and show that returns to education, experience and required skills are 
rather stable over time – cf. section 4.  
An interesting aspect of our approach is that we are able to analyse the impact of including job 
characteristics in the wage equation on unobserved heterogeneity. Section 5 takes a first step in that 
direction and shows how personal characteristics and job characteristics each influence the mean wage 
and the variation in the wage in a different way. It turns out that personal characteristics like education 
and experience explain about half of the variation in wages. At least 20 per cent is explained by 
variation in job characteristics.  
Finally, since there exist similar analyses for the Netherlands and the USA, we can compare 
the results for all three countries. Section 6 shows that the returns to experience are very close to each 
other in all countries, while the premiums on education are much higher in the USA compared to in 
Germany and the Netherlands. However, the premium on required skills in Germany is similar to that 
in the USA, and much higher than in the Netherlands. Section 7 concludes our analysis. 
 
 
2.  The wage equation used 
 
Our approach suggests that in explaining the development of wages, we should take job characteristics 
into account, next to personal characteristics of the workforce. A specification of the wage equation 
which neatly allows for both types of characteristics, since it explicitly allows for both overeducation 
(O) and undereducation (U) next to required education (R), is what Hartog (2000a) calls the ORU-
specification: 
 
wi = α  ri + β .max{0,(ai - ri)} - γ .max{0,(ri - ai)} + δ  zi + ε i   (1) 
 
where  wi is the log of wage of individual i, ai her actual years of schooling and ri the years of 
schooling required for the job on which she is working – zi represents the other relevant 
characteristics. In this equation α  represents the premium on required education, β  the premium for 
overeducation and γ  the premium for undereducation.  
Hartog (2000a and b) surveys various studies in which this relationship has been estimated. 
He consistently finds with respect to the premiums α  > β  > γ  > 0. That is, when a person is working 
on a job where the required education equals her actual education, she earns more than when she is 
undereducated for that job. And when she is overeducated for that job, she would earn more when she 
would find a job that required her actual level of education. A consequence of Hartog’s finding also is   6
that the ORU- specification performs better than the Mincerian wage equation (α  = β  = γ ) or the 
Thurow (1975) model of job competition (β  = γ  = 0). 
Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000) find in their survey that α  > γ  > β  > 0 prevails. The 
only difference with respect to Hartog’s conclusion is the ranking of the premiums for over- and 
undereducation. We use the ambiguity with respect to this ranking to motivate the restriction β  = γ . In 
that case we can separate the required skills and actual schooling in the wage equation, which leads to 
the following specification:  
 
wi = θ  ri + β  ai+ δ  zi + ε i       ( 2 )  
 
Compared to equation (1) this implies that we assume β  = γ , and θ  = α  - β  should be positive. The 
advantage of equation (2) is that the specification does not require a direct comparison of actual and 
required education in terms of years of schooling. Our data do not allow such a comparison: Both 
actual and required skills are not defined in years of schooling, but in discrete educational and skills 
levels, respectively. We therefore prefer to impose the restriction that the premiums on under- and 
overeducation are equal. Moreover, the discrete nature of our measures implies that we estimate the 
equation in the following form:  
 
wi = Σ j=1..E  θ j rij + Σ j=1..S  β j aij+ δ  zi + ε i       ( 3 )  
 
where E is the number of educational levels we distinguish and S is the number of skill levels. The 
parameters θ j and β j are the premiums for educational level and skill level j, respectively, and both 
should be increasing in j, since we expect a higher level to earn a higher premium. 
We will estimate equation (3) using data for Germany 1984 – 2000. The difference with the 
studies reviewed in Hartog (2000a,b) and Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000) is that our study 
systematically covers a longer period. Moreover we differentiate between different levels of education 
and different skill levels, although we then have to impose equal returns to under- and overeducation. 
Section 4 presents the estimation results. 
By explicitly observing job characteristics, our analysis also allows us to observe part of the 
otherwise “unobserved skills”. Thus we can further analyse the question of unobserved heterogeneity.  
This is measured by Acemoglu (2002) from the properties of the estimated values of ε  in equation (3), 
when this equation is estimated ignoring job characteristics, i.e. under the restriction θ  = 0. We can 
compare these with the properties of the residual when equation (3) is estimated without this 
restriction.  
Bauer (2002) tackles the problem of unobserved heterogeneity by using the panel structure of 
the data. He does not discuss the variance of residuals, but shows that a fixed effects model explains 
the data better than a random effects model, which in turn is superior to the pooled OLS model. He   7
suggests that this shows that “the probability of educational mismatch is correlated with innate ability” 
(p. 222). However, he emphasises that his results should be interpreted with some care because of the 
low within-sample variation of the schooling variables. In terms of equation (1) above, his finding is 
that the differences in return to education for over- and undereducation become smaller or disappear 
altogether when compared to those of adequate education. 
Bauer’s finding can be partly explained by the way he measures job characteristics, or more 
precisely required schooling: He uses the mean or modal values of observed schooling within 
occupational groups. To the extent that over- and under education occurs systematically, these 
observed values do not reflect required education well. Moreover, this method also explains Bauer’s 
finding of low within schooling variance. On the other hand his pooled OLS results show much larger 
differences in returns to over- and under education than his fixed-effect estimates. The interpretation 
that the latter result is due to unobserved innate abilities should be qualified, however. For, the fixed 
effects are also due to large tenure effects in jobs. Muysken (2002) elaborates this point by showing 
that for many firm or job related variables one should realise that average tenure in Germany is in the 
range 6 – 9 years of current employment. Thus not only unobserved personal characteristics are 
incorporated in the fixed effects, but also unobserved job characteristics. The fixed effects method 
then ignores any tendency for systematic mismatch over the period under study. Amongst others for 




3.  The data used 
 
We have used survey data obtained by the GSOEP for the years 1984 – 2000 (even years only). These 
data are a representative sample of the workforce. We eliminated those cases from the survey data for 
which either some observations were missing (in most cases) or some reported data seemed totally 
unreliable (in some cases only). We used these data to estimate wage equations with explanatory 
variables which can be attributed either to the personal characteristics of the worker, or the job (s)he 
performs. 
Personal characteristics of the worker are first of course, gender and age. However, since age 
correlates strongly with total experience, we only allow for an age dummy, which indicates whether 
the worker is younger than 20 years of age, or not. The motivation is to allow for the impact of the low 
wages of trainees and apprentices. The second personal characteristic then is working experience. 
Moreover, in order to allow for decreasing returns to learning-on-the-job, total experience squared is 
added. The third personal characteristic is education received. Here we distinguish between 
educational level on the one hand and the type of educational instruction on the other. Finally we have   8
included number of hours worked as a personal characteristic, although this is already on the 
borderline with job characteristics.  
The characteristics of the job occupied by the worker are first the size of the firm in which this 
job is located and, secondly, the level of skills required on the job. The latter will be explained in the 
intermezzo.  
 
Intermezzo: The measurement of required skills 
 
We actually use three measures of required skills next to each other. The first measure is somewhat 
similar to that used in Daly cs. (2000) and asks whether the person is working in the occupation he or 
she trained for.
5 If the respondent answers yes, our dummy variable trocc equals unity. 
The question used in Daly cs (2000) is also used in Büchel and Mertens (2000). However, 
they complement that question with another question, relating to the occupational position of the job 
holder. The latter question is also used by us to construct the variable collar, which we use in Figure 2. 
While Büchel and Mertens (2000) combine both variable in a complex scheme to indicate mismatch 
status, we use both variables separately. 
Finally we also use a measure which is derived using the Ganzeboom scale, leading to a 
division into high, medium and low skilled jobs – see Gangl (2001). This constitutes our variable 
funlev. 
We use all three variables independently as indicators of required skills. One of the advantages 
of using the specification of equation (3), is that we don’t have to combine them a priori in one 
indicator. 
Actually we used in the case of the Netherlands a different measure of required skills, which 
was based on a very detailed classification of various jobs according to required skills – cf Muysken 
and Ruholl (2001). The data are transformed with the so-called ARBI scale, which starts from the 
detailed occupational classification and divides occupations into 7 required skill levels, coded 1 to 7 
from low to high. The classification uses the complexity of occupations as a criterion and takes into 
account, amongst others, the job content, the required knowledge and mental ability.
6 We have used 
the same transformation for the USA data in Muysken et al (2002). 
An alternative method, which we did not use, can be found in Bauer (2002) for Germany. He 
employs realised job matches to infer required education either by the mean level of schooling within 
a certain occupation (Verdugo and Verdugo, 1998), or the modal value (Kiker et al 1997). In both 
cases a one-standard-deviation range around mean or mode is taken. 
The outcomes of the three German studies are summarised in Table 1 above. 
 
                       
5 Daly cs. (2000) use the question “What sort of training is usually necessary to perform this job?”, but the 
corresponding variable was not significant in our estimations. 
6 Some more details are provided in Hartog (1992), pp. 154-155 and Annex 5.2.   9
Turning back to the data we use in this study, information on the means characteristics is summarised 
for each year in the Annex, together with the natural log of the hourly net wage, which is the 
dependent variable.  
The data show, not surprisingly, an increasing share of women in the workforce (cf. the 
gender dummy).
7 Moreover, there has been to a slight increase in the number of hours worked 
(Mhours). Also the share of workers of young age, below 20 years, has almost halved, which fits the 
picture of an increase in higher education. The average experience of the workers stayed constant over 
time. The share of lower educational levels decreases modestly over time, i.e. persons who only 
possess a high school degree, which is compensated by an increase of the share above that level. Thus 
the average educational level of the workforce increases over time, cf. also Figure 1 above. The share 
of persons occupying jobs with higher required skill levels (funlevhi) increases too, whereas that with 
medium skill levels (funlevme) decreases. The share of low skilled stayed constant over time. 
However, the share of blue collar workers and civil servants clearly fell, while the overall share of 
white collar workers rose. The share of people working in management tripled over the time period, 
while the share of workers in production dropped by almost a third. The share of scientists also rose. 
The shares or means of the other variables show no clear development over time. 
 
 
4.  The estimation results 
 
We used the data presented above to estimate the wage equation in the ORU-specification – cf 
equation (3) above. Since the ordinary least squares estimation results suffer from heteroskedasticity,
8 
we re-estimated the equations with the HCCM (Heteroskedasticity Consistent Covariance Matrix) 
method offered by EViews (White, 1980). This method automatically computes the 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, hence the t-statistics are also meaningful.  
Table A2 in the Annex shows that the estimated parameter values for most variables are 
remarkably constant over time – i.e. the parameter values lie within a relatively narrow range. Since 
this definitely is the case for those variables which have a large impact, compare Figures 4–7 below, 
we feel quite confident that our estimation results do not suffer strongly from a specification bias.
9 
The estimation results indicate that almost all variables attributed to personal characteristics 
are highly significant for all years. As might be expected, being female or young has a negative impact 
on hourly wages, as does working more hours. Both current and previous experiences have a positive 
impact, although with decreasing returns. The returns to education are positive too. 
                       
7 In most European countries the share of men is larger, although it is decreasing over time. For instance, in the 
Netherlands the share of men decreased from 64 percent in 1986 to 56 percent in 1998. 
8 This was obvious from visual inspection of the estimated residuals and confirmed by White’s general test. 
9 In the spirit of the assignment approach we should estimate the job match simultaneously with our wage 
equation. However, Hartog (1992, Ch. 7) also finds that the specification bias does not have a significant impact. 
Moreover, in most instances the ORU-specification is estimated without any further discussion.   10
Most of the variables attributed to job characteristics are significant too for all years. And 
when the job requires a higher level of skills, this generally also yields a higher wage. 
Since both the direction of educational instruction and the sector in which the person is 
working are very broad aggregates and the pattern in the estimation results is not very clear, we will 
not elaborate the results for these two variables. All other results are discussed below. 
 
Age, gender and hours worked 
 
From the estimation results it can easily be inferred that being female implies that one would earn 
about 25 per cent less of the mean wage, when compared to otherwise similar males, although this 
percentage fluctuates over the years. It can also be inferred that when working part-time, decreasing 
returns to hours worked prevail.
10 The large negative impact of the agedummy is due to the impact of 
the low wages of trainees and apprentices. 
 
Experience and education 
 
We look at the returns to experience and education in more detail since they are crucial elements of a 
skill variable. Figure 4 shows the estimated premium on total experience after 21 years as well as the 
returns to current employment (9 years) and previous employment (12 years) for each year in our 
sample. One sees that this estimated premium is quite stable over the sample period. Moreover, due to 
the property of diminishing returns, the maximum premium on experience is obtained after around 30 
years. 
 
Figure 4  Premium on 21 years of experience, 1984 – 2000 
                       
10 This can be explained since we analyse the impact on net wages, i.e. after deduction of taxes and social 
security premiums. Because these premiums are relatively lower for low incomes, the net hourly wages may be 
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Figure 5 depicts the estimated premium on the various forms of education. As one might expect, this 
premium increases with the level of education.
11 Moreover, the estimated premium for higher levels of 
education is slightly falling over time. 
Figure 5  Premium on education, 1986 – 1996 
Job skills required 
 
An interesting set of variables for our analysis are the skills indicators for the job. Figures 6 and 7 
present the impact of various levels of required skills, one in the form of the collar variable, and one in 
the form of the required skill level. One sees that the impact generally increases with higher 
requirements.
12 
Figure 6  Premium on job levels, 1984 – 2000 
                       
11 The strong fluctuations for technical college degree (edlev 5) over time are due to changes in definition.  
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Interestingly, the premiums to the collar variable seems to be weakly negatively correlated to the 
premiums to the functional level variable, i.e. the impact of the collar variables has weakened over 
time and the impact of the functional level has increased, with a dip in 1998.  
 
Figure 7  Premium on functional levels, 1984 – 2000 
 
Intermezzo: interaction effects 
 
We did also test for interaction effects between personal and job characteristics – in particular between 
education obtained and job requirements measured by the variable collar. According to the assignment 
approach such interaction would indicate comparative advantage for certain job-education 
combinations. Surprisingly, almost all combinations turned out to be significant for Germany. 
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Figure 8 illustrates that all educational levels have a "comparative advantage" with respect to the 
equivalent collar level. Being a blue collar worker, the wage is highest with educational level 3, while 
the same educational level in a high skilled white collar position (collar4) pays a lot less than a higher 
educational level. These findings suggests that comparative advantages are present in these matches – 
for a further elaboration see Rieder (2002). 
 
 
5.  Wage differences due to personal and job characteristics 
 
We found strong heteroskedasticity in our estimated wage equations. This implies directly that 
increased overall inequality and unobserved heterogeneity will be observed simultaneously. Acemoglu 
(2002) found a strong increase in unobserved heterogeneity since the early 1970s for the USA. He 
attributes this to an increased return to unobserved skills, assuming no change in the composition of 
unobserved skills. We have included job levels as an additional characteristic in the wage equation, 
which enables us to analyse the impact of this thus far unobserved component on wage heterogeneity. 
Table 2 shows that indeed unobserved heterogeneity measured by the variance of residuals declines 
somewhat, due to the inclusion of job characteristics. 
 
Table 2  Variance of residuals before and after including job characteristics as an additional 
variable in the wage equation, Germany and USA. 
 
 Germany  US 
  1984 2000 1986 1996 
After 0.373 0.345 0.404 0.432 
Before  0.379 0.357 0.428 0.452 
 
However, the measures used by Acemoglu are inequality measures on the residuals. Hence the 
inequality in the residuals measured in this way is not related to the overall inequality, although this 
relationship is a prominent feature of Acemoglu’s analysis. To develop such a relationship falls 
outside the scope of the present analysis. We therefore leave a full analysis of unobserved 
heterogeneity for further research and proceed in a different way here. 
Figure 9 presents various manipulations with the wage equation of 1992 – the results are very 
similar for the other years. First we compare the fit of the equation to the observed data for various 
educational levels. One sees that the wage is slightly under estimated for all levels.  
The estimated hourly wage I indicates the correction for job characteristics. It is interesting to 
observe that this affects the mean wage of all workers, in particular the mean wage of workers with 
educational levels 5 and 6. In the latter case these characteristics account for almost 50 per cent of the 
mean hourly wage. Figure 10 shows that the distribution of the wages also is affected by the  
   14
Figure 9  The mean hourly wage rate for 1992 
 
correction.
13 Whereas the estimated distribution is skewed to the right, although mean and mode more 
or less coincide, the corrected distribution is skewed to the left and the mode exceeds the mean. Thus 
wage differences become smaller when corrected for job characteristics. The latter is in particular due 
to the differences in skill levels occupied by workers. 
 
Figure 10  The mean hourly wage rate for educational level 3 in various years 
 
The estimated hourly wage II in Figure 9 is corrected for the impact of experience. One sees that this 
correction uniformly lowers the mean wage for all educational levels. Figure 10 shows that correction 
for experience also leads to a further reduction in wage dispersion. It shows that most of the dispersion 
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per educational level observed is due to job characteristics and experience. The remaining factors – 
gender, hours worked, youth and direction of education – only contribute very little to wage dispersion 
per educational level. 
From these results we conclude that one third to one half of the total mean wage is 
independent of additional educational attainment, experience and job characteristics. For all 
educational levels job characteristics fill most of the gap. With respect to the variation in wages, job 
characteristics also play an important role. Together with experience they explain an important part of 
the wage differences amongst workers per educational category.
 14 The remaining part of the wage 
differences is explained by educational level. 
 
6.  Comparison with results for the Netherlands and the USA 
 
It is interesting to compare the results presented above with those found in Muysken and Ruholl 
(2001) for the Netherlands and in Muysken et al (2002) for the United States. The composition of the 
labour force with respect to skills and required education in the three countries is quite similar. As a 
consequence the process of upgrading observed in Figure 3 for Germany is quite similar to that for the 
Netherlands and the USA. However, Table 3 shows that the wage differentials are much larger in the 
USA. The observed wage differentials between highest and lowest education is a factor 2.85. The 
corresponding factor for Germany is 2.21 – compare Figure 9 above – and for the Netherlands it is 
1.79. 
 
Table 3  Wage differentials highest and lowest education for the Netherlands and the USA, 
1994, and 1992 for Germany
15 
 
 Observed  Corrected for job 
characteristics 
Also corrected for 
experience 
USA  2.85 2.25 2.11 
NL  1.79 1.62 1.35 
GER  2.21 1.73 1.64 
 
Table 4 summarises the estimated impact of some personal characteristics for Germany, the 
Netherlands and the USA, averaged over 1994 and 1996. The impact of the gender, age and racial 
dummies is different, whereas part-time working also has a different impact on hourly wages – all this 
reflects institutional differences. However, we saw above that experience has a very strong impact on 
wage differentials. In that light it is remarkable that the return to experience is very similar in all three 
countries. 
                       
14 These findings are also consistent with Sels cs. (2000) who find for Belgian white-collar workers in 1998 that 
wage differences are explained for about 56 per cent by personal characteristics and the remaining part by job 
and organisation characteristics. 
15 The 1994 results for Germany are too much influenced by the reunification.   16
Table 4  The impact of personal characteristics, the Netherlands, Germany and the USA 1994-96 
 
  Gender  Age 




USA -0.165    -0.096  -0.00076  0.175  0.030  -0.0005 
NL -0.146  -0.435    -0.00125    0.033  -0.0005 
GER -0.296  -0.556    -0.00097    0.040  -0.0007 
 
Figure 11 shows that the returns to education in the USA are consistently higher when compared to 
those in Germany and the Netherlands. The latter two are close for most levels - except for university 
education. The returns to required skills are rather close for the USA and Germany, however.
16 Figure 
12 reveals that the latter returns are much higher than those for the Netherlands. We therefore 
conclude that the main determinant of the higher wage differentials for the USA observed in Table 3 is 
the much higher returns to education. The differences between Germany and the Netherlands are 
caused by higher returns to skills in Germany. 
 
Figure 11  The impact of education on wages in Germany, the Netherlands and the USA, 1994-96 
 
Figure 12  The impact of required skills on wages in Germany, the Netherlands and the USA, 
1994-96 
 
                       
16 We ignore here the skill variables “trocc” and “functional levels”. These will add at most 0.2 to the values in 



























Finally, an interesting observation follows from comparing Figures 11 and 12. Both in the Netherlands 
and in the USA, the impact of a higher required skill level is lower on average than the impact of a 
higher level of education. Muysken and Ruholl (2001) use this notion to explain the divergence 
between educational attainment and wage-productivity growth in the Netherlands. Essentially they 
argue that part of the increase in educational attainment is absorbed by increased skill requirements, 
which have a lower wage premium. A similar analysis might be relevant to the discussion of the 
productivity slow-down in the USA. However, a further elaboration of this notion for the case of 
Germany is outside the scope of the present paper. 
 
 
7. Concluding  remarks 
 
In this contribution we estimate wage equations on yearly individual data for Germany, 1984 – 2000. 
In the tradition of Hartog’s (2000a) ORU-specification, we use job characteristics (e.g. skills required) 
next to personal characteristics (e.g. schooling and experience) also to explain wages. A new element 
in our study is that we track the development of wages over a longer period, 1984 – 2000. We find that 
returns to education, experience and required skills are rather stable over time – cf. section 4. 
An interesting aspect of our approach is that we are able analyse the impact of including job 
characteristics in the wage equation on unobserved heterogeneity. When analysing the impact of both 
observed and previously unobserved heterogeneity, we find that personal characteristics like education 
and experience explain about half of the variation in wages. At least 30 per cent is explained by 
variation in job characteristics. 
Finally, since Muysken and Ruholl (2001) and Muysken et al (2002) have made a similar 
analysis for the Netherlands and the USA, respectively, we compare the results for these countries. It 
turns out that the returns to experience are the same in all countries, while the premiums on education 
are much higher in the USA. The premiums on required skills in Germany are in the same range as 
those in the USA, but much higher when compared to the Netherlands. These differences explain the 
wage differentials between the three countries. This also casts some doubt on the “universalistic” view 
on the labour market as expressed in Daly et al (2000). 
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ANNEX: THE DATA USED 
 
diwlnhw:  Natural logarithm of hourly net wage, calculated by using the maximum of either 
actual or agreed upon hours worked per week 
 
gender:  Gender dummy is equal to one if person is female 
 
agedummy:  Age dummy is equal to one if person is younger than 20 
 
cempl:   Years a person has worked in the current job 
 
prevexp:   Years of experience a person had previously to current job 
 
texpsq:  Total years of experience squared 
 
mhours:  Number of hours actually worked by a person 
 
edlev2:  Education base level - a person has finished secondary school, but has received no 
other education  
 
edlev3:  Person has done apprenticeship 
 
edlev4:  Person has done vocational training other than apprenticeship 
 
edlev5:  Person has finished technical college (Fachhochschule) 
 
edlev6:  Person has finished university 
 
collar1:   Person has blue collar job  
 
collar2:  Person has low- or semiskilled white collar job or is industrial foreman 
 
collar3:  Person is semi-skilled professional 
 
collar4:  Person has professional or managerial job 
 
collar5:  Person is civil servant 
 
persons with no information given on collar standing serve as base level  
 
occa:  Person is working in business according to one digit isco code (=4) 
 
occb:  Person is working in management according to one digit isco code (=2) 
 
occc:   Person is working in production according to one digit isco code (=7) 
 
occd:  Person is working as office worker according to one digit isco code (=3) 
 
occe:  Person is working as scientist according to one digit isco code (=1) 
 
service sector, farming, forestry and fishing serve as base level 
 
 




funlevlo:  Person is working in low skilled job according to the classification by Ganzeboom 
 - serves as base level 
 
funlevme:  Person is working in medium skilled job according to the classification by 
Ganzeboom 
 
funlevhi:   Person is working in high skilled job according to the classification by Ganzeboom 
 
trocc:  Dummy variable equal to one if person is working in occupation trained for 
 
fsize3:  Size of the firm the person is working in is between 200 and 2000 employees 
 
fsize4:  Size of the firm the person is working is larger than 2000 employees 
 
all other firm sizes serve as a base level 
 
ost:  Dummy variable equal to one if person is working in the former east of Germany 
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Table A1  Mean values of the data used 
 
  1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
             
GENDER  0.37 0.36 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.43 
AGEDUMMY  0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03  0.0272 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 
CEMPL  8.94 9.47 9.48 9.44 9.67 9.74 8.89 8.12 8.11 8.55 8.05 
PREVEXP  12.07 11.64 11.49 11.41 11.75 11.66 11.98 12.92 13.06 13.22 13.26 
TEXPSQ  585.36 588.92 587.10 582.46 602.68 600.7  567.95 567.99 574.94 597.39 583.26
MHOURS  168.25 170.09 166.75 166.64 165.76 164.6  163.50 169.89 169.19 168.45 171.53
EDLEV3  0.36 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.44 
EDLEV4  0.26 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
EDLEV5  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04  0.041  0.04 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 
EDLEV6  0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07  0.079  0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 
OCCB  0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
OCCC  0.45 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.34 0.34 
OCCD  0.18 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 
OCCE  0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.22 
COLLAR1  0.48 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.38 
COLLAR2  0.26 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.30 
COLLAR3  0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.09  0.089  0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12 
COLLAR4  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.011  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
COLLAR5  0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06  0.063  0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
FUNLEVME  0.60 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.53 
FUNLEVHI  0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.23 
TROCC  0.42 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.52 
FSIZE3  0.21 0.03 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 
FSIZE4  0.25 0.04 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 
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Table A2  Estimation results for Germany, 1989-2000 
 
  1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
C  1872 1515 1277 1646 1975 1952 2040 2024 2147 2273 2091 
GENDER  -0.35 -0.30 0.32  -0.28 -0.32 -0.31 -0.29 -0.25 -0.23 -0.28 -0.25 
AGEDUMMY  -0.20 -0.44 -0.42 -0.47 -0.46 -0.47 -0.64 -0.44 -0.60 -0.67 -0.53 
CEMPL  0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
PREVEXP  0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
TEXPSQ  -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 
MHOURS  -0.001 -0.0008 -0.001 -0.0008 -0.001 -0.0009 -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002 
EDLEV3  0.03 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07  0.03  0.12 
EDLEV4  0.07 0.15 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.15 
EDLEV5  0.22 0.29 0.31 0.25 0.28 0.17 0.25 0.19 0.16 0.07 0.20 
EDLEV6  0.30 0.42 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.32 
OCCB  0.29 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.32 0.28 0.24 0.24 
OCCC  0.10 0.06 0.03  0.06 0.08 0.03  0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 
OCCD  0.11 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.08 
OCCE  0.08 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.13 
COLLAR1  0.12 0.34 0.41 0.36 0.24 0.20 0.13 0.20 0.13  0.06  0.14 
COLLAR2  0.23 0.39 0.43 0.39 0.29 0.24 0.17 0.21 0.15 0.13 0.18 
COLLAR3  0.39 0.51 0.58 0.54 0.37 0.33 0.26 0.32 0.26 0.24 0.32 
COLLAR4  0.35 0.59 0.74 0.56 0.57 0.47 0.39 0.43 0.38 0.39 0.50 
COLLAR5  0.33 0.47 0.52 0.49 0.41 0.33 0.30 0.37 0.36 0.33 0.39 
FUNLEVME  0.09 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.09 
FUNLEVHI  0.16 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.19 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.11 
TROCC  0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 
FSIZE3  0.06  0.01  0.06 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.13 
FSIZE4  0.08 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.18 0.17 
OST        0 . 1 6   -0.04  -0.26  -0.2  -0.01  -0.20 
                
R-squared  0.49 0.60 0.63 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.52 0.53 
Adj.  R-squared  0.49 0.60 0.63 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.52 0.52 
                
n  3484 3214 3413 3425 3281 3235 3419 4857 4630 4831 5267 
 
not sign at 5%
not sign at 10% 
 